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I. RULE 65B(i) UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, ALLOW FOR THE 
PROPER RAISING OF ISSUES IN THIS APPEAL 
Rule 65B(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide an 
additional opportunity for a criminal defendant to challenge his 
commitment. The rule is independent of 65B(f) which governs a 
writ of habeas corpus. The rule does not prohibit the bringing 
of similar issues under 65B(i) as may have been brought under 
65B(f). To the contrary, 65B(i)(2) indicates that a Complaint 
under this rule is not barred because similar proceedings in any 
court, state of federal, have been instituted by the complainant, 
but merely requires that the complaint set forth such pleading. 
Thereafter, if the Court determines, as did the Third District 
Court, through Judge Rokich, that the constitutionality or 
Legality of the confinement has been adjudged in such prior 
>roceedings, the complaint shall be dismissed. Subsection (10) 
f 65B(i) then provides for appellate review. 
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Clearly Appellate's request that this Court review the 
revocation of his probation is not barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata. To the contrary, because Judge Rokich used Judge 
Daniel decision as his basis for dismissing the Complaint brought 
pursuant to Rule 65B(i) the same issues as litigated by Judge 
Daniels are preserved for appeal. Had some other different 
issues been the basis of Judge Rokich's dismissal, then 
Respondent's argument of timeliness of appeal would have merit. 
As it stands, it does not. 
In Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81 (Utah 1983) the Supreme 
Court of Utah stated that Rule 65B(i) qualified a review of an 
order that was claimed to have substantially denied rights under 
the United States Constitution of the Utah Constitution, or both, 
not withstanding prior proceedings. The Court indicated that 
65B(i) provided a second round of petitions for collateral 
review, when, as here, the issues of denial of constitutional 
rights are raised. 
Respondent cites Rule 65B(10) Utah R. Civ. P., and argues 
that it required Appellant to bring the denial of his Writ of 
Habeas Corpus to the Court for review. Respondent quotes, 
however, Rule 65B(i)(10), which Appellant argues give rise to his 
right to bring the dismissal of his complaint for appellate 
review. Rule 65B(f), Utah R. Civ. P., does not have a subsection 
(10) and its presence at the end of subsection (i) specifically 
permits this appeal on all the issues raised herein. 
Since Judge Rokich relied on Judge Daniel's reasoning for 
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dismissing the Appellant's case, and because Judge Rokich 
perceived he was bound by Judge Daniel's earlier ruling, it is 
that reasoning that is at issue. Appellant should be allowed to 
attack the reasoning in this appeal, where same was used to 
dismiss his extraordinary writ. While not intending to 
"circumvent the direct appellate process," Rule 65B(i) appears to 
specifically provide a second opportunity to the Appellant to 
redress his claimed substantial denial of constitutional rights. 
Respondent's "curiosity" argument, in that it isn't 
understood by Respondent why there is no argument by Appellant 
that the doctrine of res judicata was improperly applied, is 
itself, self deceiving. Respondent appears to hope the Court 
will choose to ignore the issue that because the District Court 
was wrong the first time it denied Appellant's Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, that it didn't make it right the second time it denied 
Appellant's extraordinary writ, using the doctrine of res 
judicata. Judge Rokich;s statement that he was barred by said 
doctrine does not make the earlier ruling proper. Judge Rokich's 
ruling is equally erroneous as Judge Daniel's because he invoked 
res judicata to dismiss the action. Because he relied on Judge 
Daniel's ruling to reject Appellant's Writ, Judge Rokich invites, 
and nearly certifies for review, the same challenge to his ruling 
as would have been brought against Judge Daniel's ruling. 
In fact, as is graciously pointed out by the Respondent, if 
the doctrine of res judicata is properly applied where it should 
be applied, it would have prevented Judge Daniel's changing of 
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his mind regarding the Defendant's probation. By arguing that 
this doctrine does not apply to the probation violation 
proceeding, Respondent seems to be saying that the protection 
afforded to a person, by law and equity, do not apply when the 
need them the most. The protection are only there for the state, 
not the individual. The individual can be subjected to jeopardy 
more than once, but the state shouldn't have to face a challenge 
to its actions more than once if it doesn't feel like it. 
Appellant has properly brought the additional due process 
issue of the lack of notice. Rule 65B(i) does not carry with it 
a time frame for bringing the challenge. That there was no prior 
appeal in this matter allows the bringing of the issue in this 
first appellate review. Additionally, the argument makes perfect 
sense. Because he was not afforded proper notice, Appellant was 
unable to properly prepare his objections to the affidavit at 
that time. By learning of the second hearing on an Order to Show 
Cause only moments before it took place, Appellant was denied the 
opportunity to properly prepare his defense. Respondent now 
argues that because he didn't raise the lack of notice argument 
then, he shouldn't be allowed to raise it now. Additionally, and 
more nonsensically than any argument of Appellant's, Respondent 
states that notwithstanding the lack of notice, Appellant should 
have been prepared anyway. Respondent attempts to capitalize on 
a defendant's inability to properly prepare for hearing, by 
saying in essence that since the defendant wasn't prepared 
initially, he shouldn't be able to bring a claim that he didn't 
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have proper notice, even though the improper notice was the cause 
of the non-preparation. 
Respondent additionally seeks to penalize Appellant because 
his counsel at the time of the second hearing on the Order to 
Show Cause failed to object to said hearing on his behalf. It 
should come as no surprise to Respondent that the Appellant would 
merely follow his counsel's recommendation, particularly if the 
Appellant has no clue as to what is happening to him. His 
counsel told him to admit the allegations, and that by doing so, 
it would not affect his time incarcerated. The advice of counsel 
turned out to be very erroneous. Appellant should not be denied 
his Appeal merely because he possessed insufficient knowledge to 
object to what was happening, especially after receiving no 
notice of the second hearing. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS SHOULD APPLY WHENEVER A 
DEFENDANT IS IN JEOPARDY OF LOSING LIBERTY, 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE TYPE OF HEARING OR HEARING BODY, 
AND THEREFORE THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE 
MUST APPLY TO PROBATION REVOCATION HEARINGS 
The Constitution of the United States and of the State of 
Utah contain no provisions excepting any person or entity from 
being controlled by its protection. Clearly, certain 
constitutional rights may be suspended, however, those provisions 
which provide for due process of law, and protection against 
double jeopardy should never be exorcised from any entity's 
responsibility whenever said entity can deprive another person of 
other constitutional rights. By allowing any entity to disregard 
5 
constitutional provisions and protection, as it considers 
revoking or denying other constitutional rights of any individual 
invites absolute corruption. When a person is in jeopardy of 
losing certain constitutional rights, all constitutional 
protection, including the prohibition against placing a person 
twice in jeopardy for the same offense, should be strictly 
enforced. 
Respondent should pay more attention to the excellent 
dissent in Davenport vs. State. 574 S.W.2d 73 (Tex.Crim.App. 
1978) than it has. Said dissent provides a much more plausible 
and fair argument than the majority. Said dissenting opinion 
states in pertinent part: 
Yet the anxiety, insecurity, strain and potential 
of imprisonment are real "risks" faced by the 
probationer brought before the court on a motion to 
revoke probation filed by the State. The stigma from a 
revocation of probation is real, especially when the 
revokee is subsequently considered for parole.... 574 
S.W.2d, at 78. 
...the doctrine of double jeopardy should 
certainly attach to any subsequent efforts to revoke 
the probationer's conditions on the same offense. 574 
S.W.2d at 79. 
As stated by the Supreme Court in Burks v. U.S. 
437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1, (1978), "the 
purposes of the Clause (double jeopardy) would be 
negated were we to afford the Government an opportunity 
for the proverbial 'second bite at the apple.f"437 U.S. 
at 17, 98 S.Ct. at 2150. 574 S.W.2d at 79. 
The Utah Supreme Court has placed a jeopardy protection on 
preliminary hearings. If in fact the probation revocation 
hearing and the preliminary hearing are similar, as is argued by 
the Respondent, then the Supreme Court's ruling in State v-
Brickey. 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986) ought to apply in the probation 
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revocation hearing also. In Brickev. the Court stated, 
We find merit in the approach taken by the 
Oklahoma courts. In Jones v . State . 481 P.2d 169 
(Okla.Crim.App.1971), the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals held that due process considerations prohibit a 
prosecutor from refiling criminal charges earlier 
dismissed for insufficient evidence unless the 
prosecutor can show that new or previously unavailable 
evidence has surfaced or that other good cause 
justifies refiling. 481 P.2d at 171.... Imposing this 
requirement on prosecutors places a relatively small 
burden on them, yet adequately protects the due process 
interests of an accused. We therefore adopt this 
approach for Utah. 
If, as the Respondent argues, a probation revocation hearing and 
a preliminary hearing are similar, sufficiently so to either 
apply the doctrine of jeopardy or not apply it, then based on 
Brickey, we agree. In any event, whether in a probation hearing 
or a preliminary hearing, unless there is good cause, or new 
evidence is available, there should be no refiling of either an 
information, or an Order to Show Cause. 
Respondent attempts to say that it would be absurd or 
impossible to have a defendant on probation and incarcerated at 
the same time. This is neither impossible nor absurd. Many 
times, as a condition of probation, a probationer will be ordered 
to serve time incarcerated. Additionally, a probationer is very 
likely to comply with his probation while incarcerated. 
Additionally, it is not inconceivable that an incarcerated 
prisoner has sufficient autonomy to either cooperate or refuse to 
comply with probation officials while in prison. Nevertheless, 
the record of Appellant would show him to be a model prisoner who 
would very likely comply in all respects with probation, had it 
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been continued the second time. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent states simply that fairness dictates that one 
convicted of robbery while on probation for aggravated robbery 
ought to be committed to prison. This attitude is fairly clear 
from the states refiling the same affidavit for an Order to Show 
Cause to revoke Appellants probation when they did not obtain 
their desired results the first time. As stated above, however, 
fairness dictates that the state not get the second bite at the 
apple. Judge Wilkensen apparently disagreed with the state, at 
least the first time, when he deemed insufficient cause to revoke 
Appellant's probation. Fairness, and Appellant's due process and 
jeopardy protection rights require that the second apple bite be 
taken away, and the probation for the aggravated robbery charge 
continued. 
DATED this day of September, 1989. 
Mark H. Tanner 
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